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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
This is an interesting and intriguing paper on the neglected notion of an eikotic argument 
and its use in judicial settings. An eikotic argument is one in which an appeal is made to 
imaginable behaviour. Three kinds of considerations are typically referred in order to 
explain the imaginable behaviour: the suspect’s emotions, habits, and possible advantage. 
It is also known as an argument from plausibility. Eikotic, or arguments from plausibility 
are not ethotic arguments; an ethotic argument is one that deals with some feature of the 
character of the speaker. The key difference, I take it, is that while ethotic arguments 
focus on the character of the arguer or suspect, eikotic arguments focus on the 
circumstances that the suspect finds herself in; the plausibility of an agent’s behaviour 
given a particular set of circumstances. 
The intriguing argument of the paper is that when dealing with arguments from 
plausibility, the more convincing presentation is likely the one that suggests it to be a 
causal argument instead of a symptomatic one. Jensen’s paper adopts the pragma-
dialectic perspective which emphasises the dialogical need to reach an audience in a 
suitably economical way and where argument schemes are defined by the pragmatic 
relationship between premises and conclusion by the inference licence that connects 
them. I will endeavour in my elucidatory comments to view her analysis from a Critical 
Thinking perspective since my hope is that this clashing of methodology will bring to the 
fore the salient issues.  
 
2. THE ARGUMENT FROM PLAUSIBILITY 
 
The hypothesis of the paper is that when dealing with arguments from plausibility where 
the conclusion contains the earlier event a presentation with an explicit inference license 
that gives the argument a modus tollens structure is the better choice. Now, the modus 
ponens and the modus tollens are two forms with very similar elements. They are each 
other’s counterpart by contraposition since the statements of the antecedent and the 
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consequent have switched places and each is the other’s negation. Nevertheless, their 
rhetorical effectiveness can be rather different. 
Different presentation modes have different presentational effects and the 
suggestion is that the use of an argument with a modus tollens structure gives an 
argument an “air of causality” whereas the presentation modes of modus ponens suggest a 
symptomatic argument. This, we are told, has to do with a temporal status of the state-of-
affairs. In a modus tollens presentation, the behaviour in question is presented as after the 
state-of-affairs depicted in the conclusion; the inference license goes from earlier 
situation to later situation. The purported cause is presented in such a way as to preclude 
or exclude other plausible causes; the causal having to do with how something would 
have to have turned out. Whereas when the inference is presented in the modus ponens 
form, the behaviour at issue is presented as prior to the state-of-affairs depicted in the 
conclusion. So structured, the inference license is experienced as abductive rather than 
causal. Furthermore, the subjective mood of the modus tollens seems to be more effective 
in suggesting that the inference license belongs to common starting points. 
An example will help. Consider the following two presentations of a rather 
controversial conclusion. The first one is presented in a modus tollens pattern, the second 
exhibits a modus ponens form: 
 
 Mulroney must have known that the money he received from Schreiber was 
tainted otherwise he would not have kept the money hidden. 
 Mulroney must have known that the money he received from Schreiber was 
tainted because he kept the money hidden. 
 
The modus tollens argument can be reconstructed as follows: 
 
1. Mulroney must have known that the money he received from Schreiber was 
tainted otherwise he would not have kept the money hidden. 
2. (Since) he kept the money hidden (implied premise) 
C: He must have known that the money he received from Schreiber was tainted. 
 
The modus ponens argument can be reconstructed as follows: 
 
1. Anyone who keeps money he receives hidden must know (or at least, suspect) 
that it is tainted (implied premised.) 
2. Mulroney kept the money hidden. 
C. He must have known that the money he received from Schreiber was tainted. 
 
Note that in my reconstruction, the modus tollens argument’s missing premise is the 
negation of the presented conditional, whereas in the modus ponens version, the implied 
premise the conditional itself. This conditional is symptomatic (an argument from sign); 
i.e., it invites analysis as either a comparison or a generalisation. In this case, is appears to 
be a generalisation, and, as generalisations are wont, to invite counter-examples that may 
weaken or vitiate the generalisation itself. There are many reasons to hide money 
irrespective of any illicit behaviour. 
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The situation is subtly yet significantly different when the argument is given a 
modus tollens presentation. In this case, the missing premise to be supplied is the 
negation of the consequent of the conditional. The acceptability of this implicit premise 
brings to the fore the assessment based on criteria bound up with plausibility concerns. 
The audience (be they jurors, etc.) is asked to engage in an act of imaginative exploration. 
The assessment that the suspect did not act in a manner that a typical person in similar 
circumstances would have behaved takes on added significance. It is, I submit, this added 
significance that makes the modus tollens formulation of the argument seem 
psychologically more persuasive. The beauty of the argument scheme is that it narrows 
the compass of the implicit premise to objection and defeat. 
Hence the main claim of the paper: when the conclusion contains the earlier 
event, the presentation mode is relevant since the argument exhibits an inference license 
with a causal order when presented as a modus tollens, but exhibits an abductive order 
when presented as a modus ponens. Moreover, if the argument is presented in the modus 
ponens form, then the implicit conditional interpreted as a generalisation is subject to, and 
may fail to satisfy, what is colloquially known as the but-for test (the sine qua non rule). 
A cause-in-fact issue arises; i.e., the attempt to establish the behaviour as a necessary 
condition. It must be established that the effect would not have occurred without the act. 
Contrapositively, if there are good reasons for the standpoint to have occurred anyway, 
without the defendant’s harmful act, then the defendant’s act is not the cause-in-fact of 
the injury.  
Part of the reason the modus tollens argument seems more persuasive is that the 
implicit premise (that the consequent is not the case) is that there appears to be a filtering 
process already taking place. It shifts the onus of the argument to the plausible behaviour 
of the agent for actions subsequent to the state-of-affairs depicted in the conclusion. It is 
the implausibility of the consequent of the implicit conditional that is at stake in the 
argument. The explicit conditional being offered has, so to speak, already pre-selected 
what would be plausible behaviour one can imagine a person would do when they are in 
that situation. This is then buttressed by the implicit assertion that the accused did not do 
what would be expected for her to do.  
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
The target of Jensen’s analytical eye is the rhetorical effectiveness of arguments from 
plausibility. She argues that, under certain conditions, arguments using a modus tollens 
pattern are more effective than those presented in a modus ponens structure. The key is 
that in the modus tollens pattern, the conclusion is located temporally prior to the 
contentious behaviour that is at issue whereas in a typical modus ponens formulation the 
behaviour at issue is located prior to the state-of-affairs that constitutes the conclusion.  
One question unresolved in the paper was the relationship between arguments 
from plausibility and conditional prediction in general. Was this connection essential or 
accidental? Much seems to hang on the claim that the modus tollens has an “air of 
causality” about it, although this fuzzy phase is never really clarified. Seeking for an 
answer in the section on The Role of the Standpoint proved disappointing since the 
discussion in this penultimate section, while illuminative, was eliminative rather than 
constructive; or better, tactical rather than substantive. The section seemed more 
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concerned to thwart two hasty conjectures that do not follow from the observations made 
in the paper but did not really suggest clues for further consideration. This demonstrated 
once again the meticulousness of the analysis, but simply noting blocked avenues is 
seldom satisfying. Moreover, although the paper explicitly says that it would not grapple 
with the role of negation and that “the influence of negation is subject to further study,” it 
seems to me that this venue holds much promise and that this avenue deserved 
adumbration.  
 As such, there is an air of incompleteness about the paper; but in a good way. This 
paper is clearly but a way-station, a chance to report on work in progress, for a much 
larger, more ambitious, project that has at its heart a preoccupation with the modus tollens 
and its role as a form of indirect proof; a project that I see reflected in the author’s recent 
publications. And, if this brief paper is any indication, it is clearly a substantive project 
with much depth and promise.  
 
          Link to paper 
 
